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The Biological Father's Right to Require
a Pregnant Woman to Undergo Medical
Treatment Necessary to Sustain Fetal
Life
I. Introduction
Although most pregnant women welcome medical advances in
the field of prenatal care that enable them to give birth to healthy
children, some refuse medical treatment that a physician considers
critical not only to the health of the mother, but also to the life of
the fetus.' The recent expansion of fetal rights 2 combined with im-
proved medical technology in prenatal monitoring and treatment,
however, can create an adversarial relationship between a mother3
and her fetus." Despite serious legal issues regarding the power of
the state to intervene in the life of a pregnant woman to protect her
unborn child," the biological father' also has an inherent interest in
sustaining the life of the fetus.
Courts will inevitably confront an influx of father's rights suits
seeking to compel pregnant women to undergo medical procedures
designed to sustain the life of the human fetus.7 In determining the
1. This Comment contemplates situations in which a mother's decision to forego medical
treatment will result in fetal death, as opposed to merely diminishing the quality of fetal
health. The analysis presented in this Comment further assumes that the mother is legally
competent to decide whether to accept or reject medical treatment. The term competent refers
to a pregnant woman's ability to understand the nature and consequences of a decision to
refuse medical treatment necessary to sustain fetal life. See. e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 377, 384, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978) (patient who refused to submit to amputa-
tion was capable of appreciating her act).
2. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
3. This Comment refers to pregnant women as mothers or women.
4. This Comment uses the term fetus to describe the product of human conception prior
to live birth. This usage does not reflect moral, religious, medical, or emotional connotations
regarding the characterization of human life. The term fetus is used to emphasize that courts
have historically made legal distinctions between a human fetus and a person with complete
human rights and protection. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). "[Tjhe word 'per-
son,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." Id. at 158; see also
infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 9-43 and accompanying text.
6. This Comment uses the term biological father interchangeably with father, natural
father, and genetic father.
7. This Comment considers a wide range of medical procedures that a physician may
consider necessary to sustain fetal life. See Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v. Paddock, 127
Misc.2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985) (blood transfusion); In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily
Wash. Law Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986) (Caesarean section).
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biological father's rights in such cases, courts must consider a broad
spectrum of conflicting legal rights and interests. Courts will be obli-
gated to balance fathers' rights against both fetal interests and the
fundamental rights of pregnant women in order to resolve these po-
tential paternal-maternal conflicts. Moreover, this dilemma presents
further questions as to when and in what manner the biological fa-
ther may legally infringe upon the mother's fundamental rights in
order to maintain fetal life, and what degree of medical intrusion
may be imposed.
This Comment analyzes the biological father's right to compel a
pregnant woman to submit to medical procedures necessary to pre-
serve fetal life.8 In order to provide a factual setting illustrating situ-
ations when such a paternal-maternal conflict may arise, this Com-
ment describes recent cases that have examined court-ordered
medical treatment and state intervention designed to protect fetal
life. After discussing the evolving legal status of the human fetus
under both the common law and the Constitution, this Comment
then evaluates paternal interests in fetal life and examines a father's
right to override maternal interests and require a pregnant woman to
submit to medical treatment necessary to sustain fetal life. Finally,
this Comment analyzes the implications of forced medical treatment
on a woman's common-law right to refuse medical treatment and her
constitutional right to privacy, demonstrating that paternal interests
in fetal life may be harmonized with the rights of a pregnant
woman.
II. Court-Ordered Medical Treatment and State Intervention
Designed to Sustain Fetal Life
In response to the threat of medical malpractice claims,9 hospi-
tals have occasionally petitioned courts for declaratory relief author-
izing performance of medical procedures necessary to sustain fetal
8. Medical treatment is necessary to sustain fetal life when a physician determines to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that failure to actively intervene in a pregnancy will
result in fetal death. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86,
89, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1981) (per curiam) (examining physician concluded that fetus was
99% certain to die if delivered naturally). But see Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Or-
dered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1195 (1987) [hereinafter
Kolder] (inaccurate prognosis of harm to the fetus); see also infra note 22 and accompanying
text.
9. Hospitals and physicians apparently seek judicial intervention to invoke immunity
from liability when fetal life is threatened by a mother's decision to refuse treatment. See
Kolder, supra note 8, at 1195-96.
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life. 10 Despite a woman's refusal of medical treatment," courts have
consistently entered orders permitting physicians to force a mother
to undergo medical treatment to safeguard the fetus.' 2 Reasoning
that the state, as parens patriae,' s has the power to usurp paternal
discretion affecting a child's welfare, courts have recognized that the
state has an interest in advocating and protecting fetal interests in
such cases.' Given the latent antagonism between the rights of a
pregnant woman and the interests of the fetus, courts have over-
whelmingly determined that the interests of a human fetus outweigh
a woman's fundamental privacy rights.' 5
A representative examination of the relatively few reported
forced medical treatment cases involving pregnant women 6 demon-
strates the issues presented when a biological father attempts to co-
erce a pregnant woman to endure medical treatment to preserve fetal
life. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,
the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to stay a superior court order
authorizing a hospital to perform a sonogram and a Caesarean sec-
tion upon a pregnant woman in the event the woman presented her-
10. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203
(D.C. 1988) (Caesarean section); Kolder, supra note 8 (national survey compiling statistical
data regarding court-ordered obstetrical interventions).
11. Most pregnant women who refuse to consent to recommended medical treatment do
so on the basis of religious convictions. See, e.g., In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. Law
Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986) (Moslem religious beliefs).
12. See Kolder, supra note 8, at 1194.
13. Parens patriae refers to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability, such as infants. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
14. The state may override parental autonomy when a parent refuses to consent to life-
sustaining medical treatment for a child. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-69
(1944) (the right to practice religion does not include the liberty to expose a child to communi-
cable disease, ill health, or death). "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves." Id. at 170. In evaluating forced medical treatment cases involving pregnant
women, courts typically allow the state to advocate fetal interests. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611,
612 (D.C. 1987) (court permitted the District of Columbia to intervene for the fetus as parens
patriae).
15. For a thorough discussion of court-ordered medical treatment and state intervention
to preserve fetal life, see Daniels, Court-Ordered Caesareans: A Growing Concern for Indigent
Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1064 (1988); Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interven-
tions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); Meyers, Abuse and
Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1984); Nelson, Buggy &
Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems
Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986); Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room:
The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Note, The Crea-
tion of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and
Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
16. Courts generally must decide such cases immediately. See In re Jamaica Hosp., 128
Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (hearing convened at the mother's bedside).
17. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per curiam).
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self for the delivery of her unborn child."' After examining the
mother on several occasions prior to commencement of the lawsuit,
hospital physicians determined that there was a high probability that
the mother and child would not survive natural childbirth. 19 The
physician advised the mother, who was thirty-nine weeks pregnant,
that if a Caesarean section was performed prior to the commence-
ment of labor, both the mother and child would have an almost one
hundred percent chance of survival. 20 The mother, however, refused
the Caesarean section and blood transfusions on the basis of her reli-
gious beliefs."
The court refused to stay the trial court's order permitting the
hospital and the state to compel the mother to submit to a Caesarean
section and related procedures necessary to sustain fetal life. 2  The
Jefferson court recognized that the interests of the fetus properly
outweighed the mother's decision to forego medical treatment.
2a
Reasoning that the state can prohibit the arbitrary termination of
the life of a viable fetus,2 ' the court granted temporary custody of
the fetus to the state, giving the state "full authority to make all
decisions," including whether to consent to surgical delivery of the
child.25 Because the fetus was viable, the court ruled that the "child"
must receive proper prenatal care and subsistence necessary for its
physical life and health.26
Although court-ordered Caesarean section cases illustrate a le-
gally recognized degree of medical treatment designed to sustain fe-
tal life, courts have also decided cases involving a comparatively
lower degree of bodily intrusion deemed necessary to protect the fe-
tus. 7 In In re Jamaica Hospital,28 a hospital sought a court order
18. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
19. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 88, 274 S.E.2d 457,
458-59 (1981)(per curiam). Jefferson was the first reported state appellate decision authoriz-
ing performance of a Caesarean section over a woman's objections. The woman decided not to
return to the hospital, avoiding the court order, and delivered a healthy baby. See Jost, Mother
Versus Child, A.B.A. J. Apr. 1989, at 86.
23. Jefferson at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
24. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
25. Jefferson, at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. The court granted temporary custody of the
fetus to the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the Butts County Department of
Family and Children Services. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 458-59.
26. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
27. See Meyers, supra note 15, at 34-52. Most jurisdictions have enacted child neglect
statutes to provide for state intervention when parents fail to provide necessary medical care
for children. Some courts, moreover, have interpreted these statutes to encompass the fetus.
See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 115-16, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980); Hoener v.
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authorizing a blood transfusion for a woman who was eighteen weeks
pregnant and who was suffering from critical internal bleeding." Al-
though doctors considered the transfusion necessary to stabilize the
mother's condition and save the fetus' life, the woman refused to
consent to the procedure on religious grounds.30 The court recog-
nized the mother's "important and protected interest in the exercise
of her religious beliefs," but emphasized that the life of the unborn
fetus must also be considered. 1 The New York court stated that a
state's interest in protecting a previable fetus is less than "compel-
ling" in abortion cases.3 2 Nevertheless, the court held that "[i]n this
case, the state['s] .. .highly significant interest in protecting the
life of a mid-term fetus" outweighed the mother's right to refuse the
recommended blood transfusion on religious grounds. 3 Exercising its
parens patriae power, the court regarded the previable fetus as a
human being and appointed the examining physician special guard-
ian of the fetus." The court, moreover, ordered the physician "to
exercise his discretion to do all that in his medical judgment was
necessary to save its [the fetus'] life, including the transfusion of
blood into the mother.""6
One reported state appellate decision has addressed whether a
father may compel a competent pregnant woman to submit to medi-
cal therapy necessary for fetal survival.36 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Taft v. Taft, 7 held that a pregnant wo-
man could not be ordered, over her religious objections, to undergo
an operation designed to sustain fetal life." In this pro se proceeding
Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 521, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (1961); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d
31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
28. 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985).
29. Id. at 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
30. Id. at 1007, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
31. Id. The court examined fetal interests because the mother's life was not the only life
threatened by her decision to refuse the blood transfusion. Id.
32. Id. at 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
33. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (1985); see
also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (blood transfusion); Crouse-Irving Memorial
Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985) (blood transfusion).
34. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (1985).
35. Id.
36. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983). See also Poole v. Santa Clara
County Hosp., No. 604575 (Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty. June II, 1986) (responding to an
unwed father's request, a court ordered a hospital to continue the use of life support systems
on a brain-dead pregnant woman despite objections from the woman's parents; the child was
delivered by Caesarean section). For a brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding
Poole, see Moss, Legal Labor of Love, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 32.
37. 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
38. Id. at 335, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
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brought by the husband, the Probate and Family Court ordered the
wife, who was in her fourth month of pregnancy, to submit to a sur-
gical procedure that would enable her to carry the child to full term
and avoid a miscarriage. 9 In vacating the lower court's judgment,
the Supreme Judicial Court analogized medical treatment cases in-
stituted to preserve fetal life to a woman's fundamental right to ter-
minate a pregnancy.'"
Concerned with the woman's constitutional right to privacy, the
court held that the sparse record did not show "circumstances so
compelling as to justify curtailing the wife's constitutional rights."' 1
The court stressed that the record clearly established the wife's con-
stitutional rights, but the state's interest in requiring the operation
was not established."2 The Taft decision, therefore, demonstrates
that a woman's constitutional right to privacy may override the
state's interest in fetal life when the evidence does not sufficiently
demonstrate that medical treatment is necessary to sustain fetal
life.' 3
III. The Development of Fetal Rights
A. Fetal Rights Contingent Upon Live Birth
Until recently, the common law has been reluctant to recognize
39. Id. at 333, 446 N.E.2d at 396. Noting that the order would be a burden on the
woman's free exercise of religion, the judge ruled that the Commonwealth's interest in the
fetus justified such a burden. Id.
40. Id. at 333, 446 N.E.2d at 396. The court held:
We need not resolve the issue whether a husband has a right to insist that
his wife undergo surgery in order to assist in carrying a pregnancy to term. This
court has held that a wife may obtain an abortion, otherwise lawful, without the
consent of her husband.
Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 335, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
We do not decide whether, in some situations, there would be justification
for ordering a wife to submit to medical treatment in order to assist in carrying
a child to term. Perhaps the State's interest, in some circumstances, might be
sufficiently compelling ...to justify such a restriction on a person's constitu-
tional right of privacy.
id.
42. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 335, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983). The court stated:
The record is devoid of facts that support the judgment ordering the wife to
submit to an operation against her consent. We have no findings, based on ex-
pert testimony, describing the operative procedure, stating the nature of any
risks to the wife and to the unborn child, or setting forth whether the operation
is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as a life-saving procedure. We
have no showing of the degree of likelihood that the pregnancy will be carried to




or define legal rights protecting fetal interests." The United States
Supreme Court has also noted that the legal system has been hesi-
tant to "accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined
situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live
birth." '4 5 Considering the fetus and mother as a single entity, 6 the
common law consistently denied recovery for prenatal injuries and
predicated recovery for wrongful death upon the live birth of the
child. 7
Traditionally, courts uniformly followed the reasoning of Justice
Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,4 denying a fetal
cause of action for prenatal injuries. Recently, however, courts have
recognized a child's right to maintain a cause of action against third
parties for prenatal injuries suffered as a result of tortious conduct
inflicted on a pregnant woman.4 9 Most jurisdictions 50 presently allow
tort recovery for prenatal injuries if the fetus is subsequently born
alive.5 '1 By allowing a child to recover against a tortfeasor for prena-
44. See generally Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 15, at 739-39. At common law, a
fetus could be designated heir to a decedent's estate, although the fetus' property rights de-
pended upon live birth. Property law, however, did not confer the full rights of personhood
upon the fetus. Id. at 730.
In addition, the fetus did not attain full legal status in the criminal law. The criminal law
did not recognize the killing of a fetus as homicide, considering the fetus to be a homicide
victim only if born alive. The Model Penal Code has also adopted this approach. Thus, the
legal system generally does not afford the fetus protection under the criminal law unless states
amend homicide statutes to include the term fetus. Id. at 730-31.
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973). "[Tihe unborn have never been recognized
in the law as persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162.
46. But see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
47. In Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 139 Mass. 14 (1884), Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes denied recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus after a pregnant woman's
slip and fall upon a defective highway resulted in the miscarriage of her four- to five-month-
old fetus who died moments after birth. Justice Holmes reasoned that the fetus was a part of
the mother at the time of the injury and that the mother could recover appropriate compensa-
tory damages. Because the court did not consider the fetus a person, the fetus could not main-
tain a cause of action against the alleged tortfeasor.
48. 139 Mass. 14 (1884).
49. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (rejecting Justice
Holmes' reasoning that a viable child was "part" of the mother, the court recognized a viable
fetus as a person with standing to maintain a cause of action for prenatal injuries suffered in
utero). Bonbrest was the first case to recognize that a child could maintain a cause of action
for injuries received in utero after viability.
50. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
51. In many jurisdictions tort recovery for prenatal injury may be contingent upon the
legal status of the fetus at the time of injury. States may limit a cause of action for prenatal
injuries by only allowing recovery for injuries sustained after the point of conception, after the
point of viability, or in those cases when the fetus would have been able to maintain an action
had it lived. For a listing of each state and theory of recovery, see Beal, Can I Sue Mommy?
An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 331-32 (1984); Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next
Step in Protecting Fetal Rights?, 92 DICK. L. REV. 691, 695-99 (1988).
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tal injuries, courts have implicitly recognized the general purposes of
tort law: to compensate the innocent victim and to deter such harm-
ful acts. 2 The live birth requirement, however, presented a formida-
ble obstacle to the formulation of an adequate remedy for conduct
resulting in the death of the human fetus before live birth.
B. Erosion of the Live Birth Requirement
Many jurisdictions currently recognize fetal interests that cir-
cumvent the live birth requirement. These jurisdictions have aban-
doned the concept of live birth as a prerequisite for prenatal tort
recovery by allowing the estate of a stillborn child to maintain a
cause of action against third parties for tortious conduct that re-
sulted in the death of the fetus in utero.53 Nevertheless, recovery in a
wrongful fetal death action is substantially affected by the court's
determination of whether the state legislature intended to include a
fetus as a "person" under the wrongful death statute."
Although courts have begun to eliminate traditional restrictions
precluding recovery for prenatal injuries, some jurisdictions have
dramatically enlarged the scope of potential compensable causes of
action. Courts have expanded fetal interests to permit the subse-
quently born child to maintain a cause of action against the mother
for injuries caused by the mother's negligent conduct during preg-
nancy. 5 One jurisdiction has even suggested that children may sue
their parents for failing to prevent the child's birth when the parents
had prior knowledge of the probability that the child would be born
with birth defects. 6 Although this court implied that children may
52. See Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 601-02 (1986).
53. For a list of states recognizing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus
caused by an individual's tortious conduct, see Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 15, at 737.
54.
The majority rule . . . acknowledges that the common law has evolved to
the point that the word "person" [as contained in a wrongful death statute] does
usually include a fetus capable of extrauterine life . . . . The majority finds no
logic in the premise that if the viable infant dies immediately before birth it is
not a "person" but that if it dies immediately after birth it is a "person".
Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985) (en banc); see
also Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I11. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (viable or non-
viable); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976) (viable).
55. See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981) (mother's con-
tinued use of tetracycline during her pregnancy resulted in discoloration of the child's teeth).
56. The court saw "no sound public policy which would protect those parents from being
answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring."
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488
(1980) (dictum).
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sue parents for "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life," 57 few courts al-
low children to maintain actions under such a theory.5 Nevertheless,
some jurisdictions have recognized an infant's right to maintain a
cause of action for wrongful life against someone other than the
child's parents.59 One court, moreover, has permitted an infant to
recover damages for injuries resulting from a preconception tort, rea-
soning that allowing claims for injuries suffered by a previable fetus
avoids precluding meritorious claims when factors present only in the
prenatal environment cause congenital defects.6"
The expanding right of recovery for prenatal injury illustrates a
general trend toward recognizing fetal interests under common-law
principles. This expansion of fetal rights provides an initial basis for
recognition of a biological father's right to protect fetal interests and
to require a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment in order
to prevent fetal death. Nevertheless, the common-law expansion of
fetal interests creates an adversarial relationship between the fetus
and the mother's fundamental privacy rights.
C. The Constitutional Status of the Fetus
1. The Basic Constitutional Status of the Fetus.-The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade"1 is the fundamen-
tal source of law governing not only the constitutional status of the
fetus, but also the scope of the state's power to intervene in a wo-
57. Id. A wrongful life or wrongful birth suit is typically based upon the proposition that
an infant may bring a cause of action alleging that birth occurred and that the plaintiff both
exists and suffers due to the defendant's negligence. Thus, had the defendant not been negli-
gent, the plaintiff may not have come into existence at all. Id.
58. See PROSSER, supra note 50, at 371.
59. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (an
infant afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease was allowed to sue her mother's doctor for failing to
disclose the possibility of hereditary deafness, which deprived the parents of the opportunity to
choose not to conceive the child); see also Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656
P.2d 483 (1983). Turpin and Harbeson relied upon the theory of wrongful conception. A
wrongful conception suit is commonly grounded upon the proposition that a child may main-
tain a cause of action alleging that conception occurred and that the plaintiff both exists and
suffers due to the defendant's negligence. Thus, but for the defendant's negligence the plaintiff
may not have been conceived at all. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 226, 643 P.2d at 957, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 340.
60. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 352-53, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252-53
(1977). The Renslow court allowed a mother to maintain a cause of action on her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor daughter against a hospital and a physician for injuries the child
sustained from a blood transfusion negligently administered to the mother approximately eight
years prior to the child's conception. Id.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court concluded that the fundamental right of privacy
secured by the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of personal liberty "is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
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man's pregnancy to assert its interest in fetal life.62 Although the
Roe Court recognized the state's important and legitimate interest in
protecting potential human life,63 the Court held that such an inter-
est does not become compelling until the point of viability." Thus,
the state may regulate or proscribe abortion after viability, except
when such a procedure is necessary to preserve the mother's life.65
Although Roe addressed the state's authority to regulate mater-
nal conduct and discretion regarding abortion, a critical analysis of
the Roe decision provides a basis for determining the constitutional-
ity of a father's right to compel a woman to submit to medical treat-
ment necessary to save fetal life. Although a fetus is not considered
a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 6 such
an interpretation does not imply that the state may not grant legal
protection to a fetus in nonfourteenth amendment cases.6 7 Because
the state may forbid abortion, an act designed to extinguish life, the
state should have the power to proscribe other acts calculated or
likely to lead to the same result.68 The state's interest in preserving
fetal life by preventing such destructive acts should enable states to
authorize limited compulsory actions necessary to preserve fetal
life.69 Because the state's interest in protecting a fetus is especially
paramount in cases of potential fetal death,7" state interests would be
undermined and frustrated substantially if the state could require
62. See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (U.S. July 3,
1989) (plurality opinion). The separate opinions constituting the Webster decision indicate a
current, emerging jurisprudential trend toward expanding the state's authority to restrict and
to regulate abortion. Although the Webster holding did not explicitly overrule Roe, "the signs
are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows." Id. at 5041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Because an extensive evaluation of Webster may be unduly speculative, this Comment gener-
ally refers to pre- Webster cases when discussing abortion law. For a discussion of the Webster
decision, see Robertson, The Future of Early Abortion, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 73.
63. "[Tlhe State does have an important and legitimate interest in . . . protecting the
potentiality of human life." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
64. Id. at 163. The Supreme Court has defined viable as "potentially able to live outside
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160. The Court has further noted that
viability usually occurs during the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, but may occur as early as
the twenty-fourth week of gestation. Id.
65. Id. at 163-64.
66. Id. at 158.
67. Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of
Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1982). "The failure to understand the Roe decision has led
not only to courts mistakenly denying the unborn nonfourteenth amendment protection to
which the unborn are entitled, but also to the public failing to comprehend the discretion
remaining to American lawmakers in characterizing personhood." Id.
68. Meyers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L.
REV. 1, 18 (1984).
69. Id. "Since a failure to act can as surely lead to frustration of the state's interest as
an affirmative act, the underlying interest must reach both cases." Id.
70. Id.
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birth after viability, but could not ensure that fetal life will be sus-
tained until birth.
One commentator, 1 moreover, has suggested that a prenatal
duty may be imposed upon a mother to adequately care for the
health of her previable fetus, subject to a court order enjoining her
adverse conduct.72 Despite an affirmative duty to refrain from acts
detrimental to fetal life, some pregnant women may decide to abort
in order to circumvent such a duty. Requiring a mother to submit to
medical treatment prior to viability may appear unconstitutional
since the state's interest in fetal life does not become compelling un-
til the point of viability.73 Nevertheless, the state's interest in both
fetal health and fetal life can exist simultaneously with a woman's
constitutional right to abort prior to viability, since a prenatal duty
does not violate a woman's fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy.7
By compelling a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment
to sustain fetal life, a father does not automatically remove a wo-
man's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. Given the
state's interest in protecting a fetus, the biological father's inherent
interest in fetal life merely demands that a pregnant woman's failure
to seek necessary medical treatment neither impede nor discontinue
the potential development of fetal life. Although acknowledging the
right to abort, a biological father may force a woman not only to
take precautionary steps to improve fetal health, but also compel the
woman to submit to medical treatment designed to sustain fetal life.
An examination of the state's authority to intervene in a pregnancy,
therefore, provides a foundation for constitutionally permitting fa-
thers to compel pregnant women to undergo treatment necessary to
sustain fetal life.
Circumventing the viability standard in forced medical treat-
ment cases does not theoretically undermine the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade. The Court has recognized the arbitrariness
of the Roe viability standard by noting that the point of viability
71. Article, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 21
NEw ENG. L. REV. 595 (1986). Analyzing several Supreme Court cases interpreting abortion-
related statutes, the author states that the test of whether a statute unconstitutionally infringes
on a woman's decision to abort is not whether the statute simply affects maternal conduct
during pregnancy, but whether it actually limits or removes this fundamental right. Id. at 603.
72. Id. at 604.
73. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
74. See Article, supra note 71, at 604.
75. Id.
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must be determined by the attending physician in each case.76 Al-
though Roe precludes the state from infringing upon a woman's
right to abort prior to viability, except when necessary to protect the
mother, technological advances in embryology may lengthen the via-
bility period.77 Thus, the state may have a compelling interest in fe-
tal life at increasingly earlier points in a woman's pregnancy.7 8
Given the difficulty in ascertaining the point of viability, such a cri-
terion is an unreliable standard upon which to premise constitutional
intervention in the forced medical treatment context, as well as in
the abortion context.
A biological father's interest in a fetus should not automatically
be extinguished merely by focusing upon the unreliable viability
standard enunciated in Roe. A genetic father may compel a preg-
nant woman to undergo medical procedures without abrogating the
mother's right to abort.79 Rejecting the viability standard, moreover,
does not unduly impinge upon a pregnant woman's inviolable discre-
tion prior to viability. Protecting potential human life grants legal
recognition not only to the fetus, but also to a natural father's inter-
est in fetal life.
2. The Modified Constitutional Status of the Fe-
tus.-Although the Supreme Court has ruled that a fetus is not a
"person" for purposes of fourteenth amendment analysis, the Roe
Court held that the state has a compelling interest in protecting fetal
life.80 The state, therefore, may ban abortions after the point of via-
bility, except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or the
health of the mother.81 The general scope of a biological father's
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
77. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). "The Roe framework . . . is clearly on a collision course with it-
self." Id. at 458. "Just as improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward
the point at which the state may regulate for reasons of maternal health, different technologi-
cal improvements will move backward the point of viability at which the state may proscribe
abortions ... ." Id. at 456-57 (emphasis in original).
78. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (U.S. July 3, 1989)
(plurality opinion). The Webster decision suggests that the Roe viability standard impermissi-
bly restricts the state's ability to assert an interest in fetal life throughout a pregnancy. "[W]e
do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into exis-
tence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing
state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability." Id. at 5030.
79. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
81. Roe held that a pregnant woman possesses a fundamental right of privacy that is
broad enough to encompass her decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at
153. Although fundamental, this right is not absolute and is limited by state interests.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then pre-
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ability to force a woman to undergo medically necessary procedures
designed to preserve fetal life may be determined by equating pater-
nal interests in fetal life with potential limitations on the state's
power to proscribe postviability abortions.82
The state's interest in protecting fetal life through abortion reg-
ulation provides authority for requiring a pregnant woman to un-
dergo medical treatment to sustain fetal life.83 Nevertheless, the
state's interest in potential human life is not absolute, because the
state cannot prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus when such a pro-
cedure is "necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." '84
Because the state does not possess an unlimited power to ban
postviability abortions, the state's authority to force medical treat-
ment upon a pregnant woman in order to preserve fetal life is not
absolute. When maternal health is at risk, the woman's fundamental
privacy rights may preclude state intervention to maintain fetal
life."5
Although the state must allow third-trimester abortions neces-
sary to preserve maternal health, Roe does not clearly delineate the
constitutional limitations imposed upon the state's ability to regulate
or to ban abortions after viability.8" The Supreme Court, however,
has consistently recognized that maternal interests may subordinate
compelling state interests in the abortion context. In United States v.
Vuitch,8 7 the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a
statute requiring that abortions must be "necessary for the preserva-
tion of the mother's life or health."88 Furthermore, in Doe v. Bol-
ton,89 the Court held that a statutory provision directing a physician
to use "his best clinical judgment" when determining whether an
abortion is "necessary" was not unconstitutionally vague. 90 The con-
stitutional challenges to these statutory requirements failed because
the contested provisions had been "interpreted to allow the physician
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State
regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biologi-
cal justifications. If the state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it
may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 163-64.
82. For a discussion of paternal rights, see infra notes 112-66 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
85. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
87. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
88. Id. at 68.
89. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Roe's companion case).
90. Id. at 191-92.
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to make his determination in light of all the attendant circumstances
- psychological and emotional as well as physical - that might be
relevant to the well-being of the [mother]. '"91 The Supreme Court,
therefore, has limited the state's right to proscribe postviability abor-
tions to the extent that a physician considers the abortion necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother.92
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify when maternal in-
terests undermine the state's ability to protect a viable fetus. The
Court's decision in Colautti v. Franklin93 implicitly imposes limits
on the state's interest in regulating postviability abortions.94 The Co-
lautti Court invalidated section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act, 95 which required physicians performing abortions to use
"the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus
to be aborted alive, so long as different techniques would not be nec-
essary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother."96 The
Court stressed that the relevant statutory language did not clearly
specify that the woman's life and health must always prevail over
conflicting fetal interests.97 The Court reasoned that the statute's use
of the word "necessary" suggested that a particular abortion tech-
nique must be indispensable to the woman's life or health, not
merely desirable, before the abortion could be performed. 98 Citing
Vuitch and Bolton, the Supreme Court also noted that the statute
did not imply that a physician could consider all factors relevant to
the welfare of the woman in determining whether a postviability
abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's life or health.99 Based
upon this analysis, the Court concluded:
Consequently, it is uncertain whether the statute permits
the physician to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount
to his duty to the fetus, or whether it requires the physician to
make a "trade-off" between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival. Serious ethical and constitu-
91. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979). The Supreme Court in Colautti
expressly noted that the Court in Bolton "found it critical" that the physician's judgment
"may be exercised in light of all factors - physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age - relevant to the well being of the patient." Id. at 387-88.
92. See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
93. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
94. Id. at 400-01.
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
96. Id.




tional difficulties, that we do not address, lurk behind this ambi-
guity. We hold only that where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible
criminal sanctions. 100
Thus, the Colautti Court did not directly address the constitutional
concerns related to the adversarial interests that may exist between a
mother and her viable fetus.
The Supreme Court, however, adopted the reasoning implicit in
Colautti regarding the conflict between maternal health risks and
fetal interests. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists,'10 the Court reviewed Pennsylvania's amended
Abortion Control Act, 102 which required that the abortion technique
employed in postviability abortions must be the method providing
the "best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted alive," un-
less the procedure would present a "significantly greater medical risk
to the life or health of the pregnant woman.' 03 Adopting the lower
court's reasoning, the Thornburgh Court held that the statute was
facially invalid because "the language of the statute 'is not suscepti-
ble to a construction that does not require the mother to bear an
increased medical risk in order to save her viable fetus.' "104 More-
over, the Court recalled Colautti by noting that "this Court has rec-
ognized the undesirability of any 'trade-off' between the woman's
health and additional percentage points of fetal survival."' 5
The constitutional limitations imposed upon the state's authority
to proscribe abortion characterize the scope of a natural father's
right to compel a woman to submit to treatment intended to preserve
fetal life. Although the state may forbid abortion after the point of
viability, the state's interest in fetal life is not unqualified. The state
must permit postviability abortions when medically necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the mother. 10 6 The state's authority to
ban abortion, therefore, is initially limited by the attending physi-
cian's determination that the abortion of a viable fetus is necessary
100. Id. at 400-01.
101. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
102. 18 PA. CONS, STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (Purdon 1983).
103. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(b) (Pur-
don 1983)).
104. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769 (quoting American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 300 (3d Cir. 1984)).
105. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400
(1979)).
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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to safeguard maternal health.1"7
Nevertheless, the state's compelling postviability interest in fetal
life implicitly outweighs a woman's constitutional right to terminate
her pregnancy until declining maternal health necessitates abortion.
Because a pregnant woman's life and health should prevail over fetal
life, a mother does not have to bear increased medical risks in order
to save a viable fetus.1"8 When maternal health has sufficiently dete-
riorated to warrant the active termination of a pregnancy, the state
may not exercise its interest in the human fetus by proscribing abor-
tion."0 9 Until maternal health actually necessitates abortion, how-
ever, the state's interest in fetal life could subordinate the woman's
right to abort, requiring the mother to bear increased medical risks
to sustain fetal life.
Asserting that a father's interest in a viable fetus does not per-
mit an affirmative right to require a pregnant woman to undergo
treatment to sustain fetal life is incorrect. Until an abortion becomes
"necessary" to preserve maternal health, a biological father's interest
in a postviable fetus should continue to supersede maternal interests.
The father, therefore, may actively impose medical treatment upon a
pregnant woman until an abortion becomes necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. Thus, if paternal interests in fetal life
conflict with a woman's rights in a nonabortion context without im-
plicating the mother's constitutional right to necessary postviability
abortions to protect her health, the interests of the father may over-
ride maternal health concerns in forced medical treatment cases.
A genetic father should be permitted to compel a pregnant wo-
man to bear an increased risk to her health through coerced medical
treatment. Given the limitations on the state's authority to proscribe
abortion, such a paternal right would not be absolute. Paternal
rights, however, should be limited by a physician's determination of
whether an abortion is necessary to preserve maternal health. °
These rights, moreover, are significantly affected by a woman's con-
stitutional right to privacy, as well as other fundamental legal
rights."'
IV. Legal Rights of Biological Fathers
The legal recognition of paternal rights in custody and adoption
107. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386-87 (1979).
108. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
IIl. See infra notes 167-211 and accompanying text.
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disputes has significantly expanded to afford fathers a substantial le-
gal interest in their children. Although courts continue to resolve
traditional paternity issues, modern jurisprudence has attempted to
address highly controversial issues concerning the biological father's
interest in fetal life. As fathers attempt to exert an interest in the
human fetus, the legal system will be forced to address complex legal
claims. Although conventional legal doctrines focus on subsequently
born children, 1 2 traditional legal analysis provides a basic frame-
work to develop and examine a biological father's inherent privacy
right in fetal life.
A. The Expanding Rights of Natural Fathers to Subsequently
Born Children
The early common law granted exclusive custody rights over le-
gitimate minor children to the biological father."' Reasoning that
children need to be raised by their mother," 4 courts subsequently
developed a "tender years" presumption that favored maternal cus-
tody." 5 The tender years doctrine assumes that a mother is better
suited than a father to raise young children." 6 Courts, however, have
generally replaced the tender years doctrine with a standard based
upon the "best interests" of the child." 7 Emphasizing that the act of
112. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
113. Several rationales were developed to explain this favored status. Some defended the
rule on the ground that the father should have control because he owed the duty to support the
children of the marriage. Others noted that marriage incorporated the mother's legal identity
into that of the father. Others cited divine ordinance. See Roth, The Tender Years Presump-
tion in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 427-28 (1976-77).
114. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender . . . . The constitution of
the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood . . . . The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id.
115. By the 1940s, this principle was firmly established in the American legal tradition.
Othner & Lewis, Evidence of Single-Father Competence in Childrearing, 13 FAM. L.Q. 27, 30
(1979).
116. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921).
For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate substitute for mother
love - for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that
only a mother can give . . . . The difference between fatherhood and mother-
hood . . . is fundamental, and the law should recognize it unless offset by unde-
sirable traits in the mother.
Id. at -, 181 N.W. at 827.
117. See Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973). The court held
that "sound application of the 'best interests of the child' criteria requires that the court not
place a greater burden on the father in proving suitability for custody than on the mother." Id.
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mothering is more important than the biological fact of being a
mother,1 18 courts have noted that the principles embodied in the
tender years doctrine perpetuate "anachronistic" stereotypes." 9 Ac-
cordingly, many courts have recognized that legitimate fathers
should have an increased role in the determination of child custody
matters. 2 o
The father of an illegitimate child had no legal rights to his
children at common law. 2 ' The Supreme Court, however, signifi-
cantly expanded the rights of such fathers in Stanley v. Illinois.'22
Under an Illinois statutory scheme, the children of unwed fathers
automatically became wards of the state upon the death of the
mother without a hearing on parental fitness.' 23 By contrast, a legal
presumption existed that married fathers were fit to raise their chil-
dren. 24 The Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute violated an
unwed father's due process and equal protection rights embodied in
the fourteenth amendment. 25 Although the Stanley Court did not
address the degree of legal protection given to an unwed father's
rights in custody disputes, 12 6 the Supreme Court has subsequently
decided a series of cases, based on equal protection and substantive
due process grounds, that have refined and expanded an unwed fa-
ther's legal interest in his children when the father has attempted to
establish a substantial relationship with the child. 2 7 Although bio-
at 179, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 286; see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 974 (1983).
118. Watts at 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 289. "The rule giving the mother preferential right
to custody is considerably softened by the realization that 'all things never are exactly equal'
and is predicated upon the acts of motherhood - not the fact of motherhood." (quoting Gar-
rett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)) (emphasis in original); see also
Haag v. Haag, 336 Pa. Super. 491, 485 A.2d 1189 (1984) (abolishing the tender years
doctrine).
119. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986). By granting custody to the mother
in a "tie-breaker" situation, the court is "denying custody to all fathers who ... are as capa-
ble as the mother. ... Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. See Embick, The Illegitimate Father, 3 J. FAM. L. 321 (1963).
122. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
123. Id. at 646.
124. Id. at 647.
125. Id. at 647-58. The Court stated:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."
Id. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
126. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978). "Stanley left unresolved the
degree of protection a state must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation . . . in
which the countervailing interests are more substantial." Id.
127. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (due process and equal protection
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logical fathers, of both legitimate and illegitimate children, have
gained an increased legal interest in subsequently born children, a
natural father's interest in sustaining fetal life in forced medical
treatment cases is still uncertain.
B. The Biological Father's Interest in the Fetus
1. Spousal Abortion Consent Statutes.-Although natural fa-
thers have gained an increased legal interest in their living children,
courts have not extensively evaluated the biological father's interest
in the fetus. Spousal consent abortion statutes, however, provide a
foundation for analyzing the father's interest in the fetus and his
right to require the mother of his unborn child to undergo medical
treatment necessary to sustain fetal life.
The Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth,'28 held that a state may not constitutionally re-
quire spousal consent as a condition for abortion during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy .1 9 The Court reasoned that since the
state cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy, the state cannot delegate authority to the spouse to
prevent abortion during that same period.' 30 The Court recognized
the "deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and protec-
tive husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and de-
velopment of the fetus she is carrying," but held that the state does
not have the constitutional authority to give the spouse the unilateral
ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy.' 3 ' The
Court reasoned that because the woman physically bears the child
principles do not give the illegitimate father the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the child is adopted when the father has never established a substantial relationship
with his child by coming forward to participate in the rearing of the child); Caban v. Moham-
med, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (because an unwed father may have a relationship with his children
fully comparable to that of the mother, an undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers, applicable to all circumstances when adoption of their child is at issue,
does not bear a substantial relationship to a legitimate state interest); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (equal protection principles do not require that an illegitimate father's au-
thority to veto an adoption be measured by the same standard as applied to married fathers
when the illegitimate father does not seek custody of the child and had no part in the child's
daily supervision, protection and education).
128. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Danforth. See also Conn v. Conn, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988); Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d
959 (Ind. 1988); Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); see also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1988, at A20, col. 1; Moss, Father's Rights Sought, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1988, at 19.
129. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 69-70. The Court also recognized the importance of the marital relationship
in society and the possibly deleterious effects an abortion may have on the physical and mental
aspects of the marriage. Id.
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and is, therefore, more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy, maternal interests outweigh paternal interests in such
cases. 1
32
Although the Danforth Court acknowledged the father's inter-
est in the fetus, the decision appears to not only diminish, but sub-
stantially impede a father's right to protect his interest in the unborn
child.13 3 Until the point of viability, the state's interest in potential
human life is outweighed by the mother's fundamental right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy.134 The Danforth Court invali-
dated Missouri's spousal consent statute simply by reasoning that
"since the State cannot . . . proscribe abortion . . . the State cannot
delegate authority to . . . the spouse, to prevent abortion . .1.3.
Spousal consent statutes, however, do not delegate to the hus-
band the power to vindicate the state's interest in the future life of
the fetus.' 36 Such statutes recognize that the husband has an inde-
pendent interest in the life of the fetus that should not be extin-
guished by the unilateral decision of the wife.'"" "It by no means
follows, from the fact that the mother's interest in deciding 'whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy' outweighs the State's interest in
the potential life of the fetus, that the husband's interest is also out-
weighed and may not be protected . . .,8
The father clearly does have an interest in his unborn child, de-
spite disagreement over the precise extent of this interest. The sanc-
tity of the family is afforded constitutional protection."3 9 A father's
familial interest in having a child - perhaps his only child - may
be unmatched by any other interest in his life.140 The Supreme
Court has held that procreation is a fundamental civil right, " and
that the right to conceive and to raise one's children is far more im-
portant than property rights.'14  Although it invalidated a spousal
132. Id. at 71.
133. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
136. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis in original). "It is truly surprising that the majority finds in the
United States Constitution . . . a rule that the State must assign a greater value to a mother's
decision to cut off a potential human life by abortion than to a father's decision to let it mature
into a live child." Id.
139. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
140. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right to establish a home and bring up children).
142. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
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consent statute, the Danforth Court recognized the father's interest
in fetal life. 4  Danforth applies specifically to the abortion context,
when the father's interest in fetal life directly opposes the woman's
right to abortion. 44
A critical analysis of the principles set forth in Danforth sug-
gests the circumstances under which a biological father may inter-
vene in a woman's pregnancy to compel medical treatment necessary
to sustain fetal life. Danforth supports the proposition that the state
cannot delegate spousal authority to prevent abortion during the pe-
riod when the state itself cannot regulate or proscribe abortion. 45
Thus, the Danforth Court implicitly equated paternal interests in the
human fetus with the state's interests in the potentiality of human
life. Consequently, paternal interests in fetal life, like the state's im-
portant and legitimate interest in potential human life, would exist
throughout the woman's pregnancy and become compelling at the
undeterminable point of viability.1 46 The father would possess a right
commensurate to the state's interests at the point of viability, ena-
bling the father to constitutionally prevent abortions after the point
of viability, except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.
In the context of forced medical treatment, the biological fa-
ther's interest in postviable fetal life should subordinate a woman's
constitutional right to privacy. The biological father could require a
pregnant woman to bear an increased health risk, through forced
medical treatment, until the point when abortion becomes necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother. Moreover, the father's
right to compel medical treatment can coexist with the right to abor-
tion prior to viability. The father, therefore, could force a pregnant
woman to submit to nonconsensual medical procedures designed to
sustain fetal life before the point of viability so long as the mother's
fundamental right to abortion is not endangered.
2. Other Statutes Relating to Abortion.-The biological fa-
ther's right to impose medical treatment upon a pregnant woman
may appear to be an unconstitutional infringement upon a woman's
fundamental right to make intimate decisions. 47 To analyze whether
143. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69-70.
144. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71 ("as between the two [the mother and father], the bal-
ance weighs in her [the mother's] favor.").
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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paternal interests in a fetus impinge upon a pregnant woman's right
to privacy, various restrictions that states may place upon abortion
decisions must be considered. An examination of abortion statute
cases demonstrates that the father's right to compel a pregnant wo-
man to undergo medical treatment necessary to sustain fetal life is
not per se unconstitutional.
Although the Supreme Court has established that a woman's
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy is a fundamental
right encompassed within the right to privacy, a state may regulate
and place restrictions on the abortion decision to further compelling
state interests.1"8 The Supreme Court has distinguished between
those abortion-related statutes that merely affect maternal conduct
during pregnancy"' 9 and those statutes that actually nullify the right
to abort. 150 The Court has consistently invalidated statutes that pre-
vent women from exercising their right to terminate pregnancy. In
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,'5' the Su-
preme Court invalidated a Missouri statute requiring spousal consent
as a prerequisite to obtaining an abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy. 5 ' Moreover, the Court, in Bellotti v. Baird, 55  de-
clared unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute requiring minor
women to obtain parental consent as a condition for abortion.', Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court has held that state regulation requir-
ing extended waiting periods and detailed informed consent are un-
constitutional when those restrictions are not reasonably related to
furthering the state's legitimate interest in maternal health. 55
148. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973). The state's important and legitimate
interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first
trimester. Id. at 163. The state's important and legitimate interest in the potential life of the
fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability and the state may regulate and even pro-
scribe abortion during that period. Id. at 163-64.
149. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
151. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
152. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
153. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
154. The Court stated that "if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain
one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it [the state] also must provide an alternative
procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained." Id. at 643 (footnote omit-
ted). The pregnant minor, therefore, is entitled to a judicial proceeding to show either: (I) that
she is mature enough to make her abortion decision independent of her parents' wishes; or (2)
that the desired abortion would be in her best interest. Id. at 643-44. If the court finds the
minor sufficiently mature to decide to abort, the court must allow the minor to make the
decision without parental consent. Id. at 647. If the minor is not competent to decide to abort,
the court must allow her to abort if the procedure would be in her best interest. Id. at 647-48.
155. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). The statute
required that all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a
hospital. Id. at 422. The statute also contained an extensive informed consent provision
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Although the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that have
the primary effect of preventing women from exercising their consti-
tutional right to abort, the Court has upheld statutes that merely
make the woman's decision to abort more difficult. In Maher v.
Roe,1" the Supreme Court upheld a statute limiting state Medicaid
benefits for women who sought nontherapeutic abortions. 157  The
Court held that the regulation did not impinge upon the woman's
fundamental right to abortion. 58 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in
Harris v. McRae,a" sustained a statute removing public funds for
certain medically necessary therapeutic abortions. 60 Similarly, the
Court upheld a parental notification provision for minor women seek-
ing abortions."' Unlike the parental consent statutes invalidated in
Bellotti v. Baird,'12 the parental notification statute did not give par-
ents the power to veto a minor woman's abortion decision. 6
A comparison of the biological father's interest in the fetus to
the state's interest in potential life in the context of abortion-related
statutes establishes that the state may constitutionally enable fathers
to require pregnant women to undergo medical treatment. The bio-
logical father has an interest in fetal life.' 6 ' An abortion-related stat-
ute unduly infringes on a woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy only when the regulation materially removes the woman's
designed to persuade the mother to withhold consent. Id. at 444-45.
156. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
157. Id. at 466; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 57 U.S.L.W. 5023
(U.S. July 3, 1989).
158. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. "It [the right to abortion] implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to imple-
ment that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Id. "There is a basic difference be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alter-
native activity consonant with legislative policy." Id. at 475 (footnote omitted). See also Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require the fund-
ing of nontherapeutic abortions.)
159. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
160. "Where, as here, the Congress has [not] invaded a substantive constitutional right
. . . the only requirement of equal protection is that congressional action be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 326. "The Hyde Amendment . . . places no
governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but
rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion . . . encourages alternative activity
deemed in the public interest." Id. at 315. The Court concluded that the statute was rationally
related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Id. at 324-26.
161. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
162. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
163. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411. "The Utah statute gives neither parents nor judges a
veto power over the minor's abortion decision." Id. (footnote omitted). "Although we have held
that a state may not constitutionally legislate a blanket, unreviewable power of parents to veto
their daughter's abortion, a statute setting out a 'mere requirement of parental notice' does not
violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor." Id. at 409 (footnotes
omitted).
164. See supra notes 128-46 and accompanying text.
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right to obtain an abortion. Forced medical treatment, however, does
not eliminate a woman's fundamental right to abortion; such treat-
ment merely affects maternal conduct during pregnancy. The fa-
ther's interest in fetal life, whether recognized throughout preg-
nancy1"5 or as coexisting with the state's interest in potential life, 116
does not automatically remove the woman's right to abort. Thus,
both the state's and the father's interest in fetal life can coexist with
the mother's right to abortion prior to viability. For this reason, the
biological father's right to require a woman to submit to medical
procedures necessary to preserve fetal life can exist throughout the
woman's pregnancy.
V. Legal Rights of Pregnant Women
A. The Right to Bodily Integrity
1. The Common Law Right to Refuse Medical Treat-
ment.-Courts have uniformly recognized the fundamental impor-
tance of an individual's right to bodily integrity.167 The right to bod-
ily integrity gives every individual the right to "possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference,"
except in cases of "clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 68
Courts have consistently adopted the principle that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he [the surgeon] is liable in damages.' 69 The informed consent doc-
trine, moreover, imposes a duty on physicians to inform patients
about the nature, benefits, risks, and alternatives of a given course of
treatment, to enable the patient to make fully informed decisions re-
garding medical treatment.
70
Legally established safeguards, such as informed consent, to
165. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
167. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). "No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, un-
less by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
168. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Botsford).
169. Schloendroff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). The exception to this rule is in cases of emergency when the patient is unconscious and
it is necessary to perform medical procedures before the patient can consent. Id. at 130, 105
N.E. at 93.
170. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
514 (1972).
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protect persons from unwanted bodily intrusions allow an individual
to "choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of his bodily
integrity."'1 71 Many courts have recognized that the common law
right to forego medical treatment is encompassed within the consti-
tutional right to privacy. 1 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 17  stated:
Of even broader import [than the common law right to bod-
ily integrity], but arising from the same regard for human dig-
nity and self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional right
of privacy .. . .As this constitutional guaranty reaches out to
protect the freedom of a woman to terminate pregnancy under
certain conditions . . so it encompasses the right of a patient
to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted infringe-
ments of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances."7 4
Courts have also recognized that an individual may forego medical
treatment even when that refusal would result in death.
1 5
Nevertheless, the common law right to bodily integrity is not
unqualified. The state's interests in the preservation of life, the pre-
vention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties, and the
maintenance of medical ethics may override the individual's right to
refuse medical treatment. 76 Although the state's interests in certain
nonconsensual bodily invasions, such as compulsory vaccinations1
77
and intrusions to obtain evidence from criminal suspects 178 may be
easily justified as protecting the public interest, the state's authority
to compel unwanted bodily intrusions must be determined on a case-
by-case basis.'
79
A competent pregnant woman who refuses medical treatment
171. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984).
172. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
173. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
174. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted).
175. E.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390
N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
176. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225
(1984); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370
N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
177. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 187 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox vaccination).
178. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compulsory blood test to determine
alcohol content was not an unreasonable search and seizure); see also United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
179. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
necessary to sustain the life of her fetus has a direct personal interest
in her bodily integrity. Undoubtedly, compelling a pregnant woman
to undergo medical treatment against her will is a direct violation of
her bodily integrity. The common law right to bodily integrity allows
the competent woman, whether pregnant or not, to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.""0 Under certain circumstances, however, the
right of a mother to refuse medical treatment must yield to the bio-
logical father's interest in the unborn child.' 8'
2. The Fourth Amendment Right to Bodily Integrity.-The
fourth amendment restraints on governmental searches and seizures
provide an explicit constitutional source for the right to bodily integ-
rity.182 The fourth amendment prohibits the state from performing
unreasonable physical searches. 83 An analysis of relevant search and
seizure cases provides a framework for acknowledging paternal
rights to impose medical treatment upon pregnant women.
The fourth amendment protects "the individual's legitimate ex-
pectations that in certain places and at certain times he has 'the
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.' """" Nevertheless, nonconsensual
physically intrusive procedures have withstood constitutional scru-
tiny. Because the right to bodily integrity is not absolute,80 the
United States Supreme Court has not adopted a per se rule against
all bodily intrusions.'
Recognizing the individual's right to bodily integrity, courts es-
tablished various guidelines for determining what constitutes an ac-
ceptable compelled physical intrusion.8 7 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Winston v. Lee188 provides a comprehensive statement of the
180. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
182. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
183. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
184. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
185. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
186. "[Tjhe fourth amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intru-
sions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are
made in an improper manner." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 768. The Court added
that merely because "we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates
that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 757 (1966) (compulsory blood test to determine alcohol content was not un-
reasonable search and seizure); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
188. 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (court-ordered surgery to remove bullet from an alleged rob-
bery suspect that would provide evidence of his guilt or innocence was a violation of defend-
ant's constitutional rights).
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constitutional limitations imposed on the state's authority to compel
physical intrusions. "The reasonableness of surgical intrusions be-
neath the skin [as permitted by the fourth amendment] depends on a
case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy
and security are weighed against society's [the state's] interests in
conducting the procedure."' 89 The Winston Court recognized that
several factors should govern the permissible scope of the state's
power to infringe on the right to bodily integrity. 90 Such factors in-
clude: the extent to which the procedure may threaten the individ-
ual's safety or health, the extent of the intrusion upon the individ-
ual's dignity interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, the
extent to which reasonable medical precautions were taken and no
untested or unusual procedures performed, and the state's interests
in obtaining evidence.1 9' Noting that the characterization of surgery
as either major or minor would not control the reasonableness of
bodily invasions," 2 the Supreme Court approved the lower court's
consideration of other factors relating to the reasonableness of the
surgery, such as the size and depth of incision, the risk of infection,
the length of time for surgery and type of anesthesia.'3
Although the fourth amendment does not prohibit the state
from compelling bodily intrusions, forcing a pregnant woman to un-
dergo medical treatment for the sake of her fetus poses a serious
legal dilemma. Balancing the mother's right to bodily integrity
against the father's interest in fetal life suggests that a father may
order a pregnant woman to submit to physically intrusive procedures
to sustain fetal life. The rights of the biological father may also de-
termine what constitutes an acceptable degree of nonconsensual
medical intrusion on the pregnant woman's right to bodily integ-
rity.19"4 Thus, the balancing test set forth by the Court in the fourth
amendment cases provides a constitutional basis for permitting fa-
thers to reasonably subject a mother to physically invasive medical
procedures to protect fetal life.
B. Infringement of the Woman's Right to Privacy
The constitutional right of privacy allows an individual to make
189. Id. at 760 (analyzing the framework adopted in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966)).
190. Id. at 760-63.
191. Id. at 758-63.
192. Id. at 764 n.8.
193. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1985).
194. See supra notes 113-66 and accompanying text.
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certain decisions without governmental interference.195 Allowing the
father of an unborn child to compel the mother to submit to medical
treatment clearly affects the woman's fundamental right to make
personal decisions. Although the right of privacy limits the state's
power to intervene in the life of a pregnant woman, the analytical
framework developed by the Supreme Court in privacy cases pro-
vides guidelines to determine the extent to which biological fathers
may compel pregnant women to undergo unwanted medical
treatment.
Although the Constitution does not expressly mention the right
of privacy, the Supreme Court has found the right embodied in the
penumbras, or zones of privacy, emanating from specific constitu-
tional guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. 19 6 The Court has
recognized that an individual has a privacy right when making inti-
mate decisions concerning reproductive matters. 97 Because the right
of privacy encompasses the fundamental right to make decisions free
from state intrusion, state infringement on an individual's privacy
interest must withstand strict judicial scrutiny. 9 8 Nevertheless, the
right to autonomous decision-making is not absolute. The state may
constitutionally infringe upon an individual's fundamental right of
privacy by employing the least restrictive means' 99 to promote a
compelling state interest.200 The state, therefore, is prohibited from
unduly infringing on protected rights without proper constitutional
deference to the individual's decision-making autonomy.
195. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (right to privacy protects decision of
whether to bear a child).
196. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right of privacy is implied in
the penumbras of the first amendment right of association, the third amendment prohibition
against quartering soldiers, the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination and the ninth amend-
ment. Id. at 484. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fourteenth amendment).
197. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right of minors to use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmar-
ried couples to use contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couples to use contraceptives);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education). But cf., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (right of privacy does not include right to engage in acts of homosexual sodomy in
one's own home).
198. Strict scrutiny is a higher standard of judicial review used to examine the constitu-
tionality of state action that infringes on an individual's fundamental rights.
199. "[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
200. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regula-
tion limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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Government action designed to deprive women of the funda-
mental right to control decisions regarding bodily integrity during
pregnancy must withstand strict judicial scrutiny.201 Undoubtedly,
requiring a woman to bear a child against her will is an intrusion on
a fundamental right. The right of privacy specifically protects the
woman's decision not to conceive 0 2 and not to bear children.20 3 Nev-
ertheless, the pregnant woman's right of privacy is not absolute. The
state's compelling interest in the potential life of a viable fetus val-
idly removes the mother's constitutional guarantee of autonomous
decision-making. The state may have a similarly compelling interest
in requiring a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment to pre-
serve fetal life after viability. Such a compelling interest may over-
ride the mother's right of privacy when the recommended treatment
is the least restrictive means to protect the fetus. 0 4 Because the right
to impose medical treatment can coexist with the right to abortion,
the state may require the mother to submit to treatment necessary to
preserve the life of the fetus, whether viable or previable, if the
mother's fundamental right to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy is not completely removed or otherwise unduly hindered.20 5
Although maternal interests are fundamentally affected, a father's
right to impose medical treatment upon a pregnant woman to sustain
fetal life, therefore, does not unduly infringe on the woman's per-
sonal autonomy in light of the state's authority to preserve fetal life.
C. Equal Protection Implications
The concept of compelling pregnant women to undergo medical
treatment raises serious equal protection concerns. Two potential vio-
lations of the equal protection clause arise in this nonabortion con-
text. Because only women, can biologically bear children, only
women will be required to submit to such bodily intrusions. Further-
more, pregnant women will be subjected to unwanted medical proce-
dures while nonpregnant women will not be forced to experience
such bodily invasions. Consequently, the biological father's right to
compel a pregnant woman to submit to nonconsensual bodily intru-
sions presents dual equal protection implications.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quires the uniform treatment of persons who are similarly situated
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
202. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
203. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
204. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
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with respect to the challenged government action.206 The equal pro-
tection clause, more specifically, protects women from discrimination
on the basis of sex. 07 Nevertheless, equal protection of the laws is
only granted to the extent that women are "similarly situated" to
men.20 8 As a result, women are not granted protection against dis-
crimination based upon the undisputed biological fact that only
women can bear children. Unequal. treatment based upon pregnancy
does not discriminate against women solely because of gender, but
rather discriminates rationally between pregnant and nonpregnant
individuals. 209 Consequently, women are not constitutionally pro-
tected against gender discrimination predicated on reproductive
ability.
Because women's reproductive capability provides a constitu-
tional basis for differential treatment, a biological father's right to
compel medical procedures in pregnancy cases does not violate the
demands of the equal protection clause. Under the equal protection
clause, the reproductive difference between men and women is a con-
stitutionally acceptable basis to permit forcible physical intrusions
upon a pregnant woman to sustain fetal life. Further, even if a court
were to hold that pregnant women are protected by the equal protec-
tion clause, the father's interest in potential human life could over-
ride equal protection concerns raised in forced medical treatment
cases.
206. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
207. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The constitutionality of laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender are judicially reviewed according to an "intermediate scrutiny"
test. "To withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 197.
208.
[TIhe Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily ap-
ply equally to all persons" or require "things which are different in fact . . . to
be treated in law as though they were the same" ... [therefore] this Court has
consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but
rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances.
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citations omitted).
209. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (California's decision not to insure the risk
of disability resulting from normal pregnancy did not constitute invidious discrimination under
the equal protection clause). "[W]ith respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line
drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose their judgment
.d. at 495.
Following that decision, Congress acted to protect women from pregnancy related employ-
ment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). Subsequent Supreme Court cases have fo-
cused on whether Congress, not the Constitution, forbids the pregnancy related classification at
issue. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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VI. Conclusion
Although a pregnant woman has a constitutional right to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy, she may not have the right to
refuse medical treatment necessary to support the life of the fetus.
Paternal interests in fetal life may outweigh a pregnant woman's
right to bodily integrity and fundamental right to make intimate de-
cisions. Given procedural safeguards designed to preserve the life or
health of the mother, the biological father may have the inherent
authority to intervene in a pregnancy subsequent to viability to pro-
tect his interest in fetal life. Because the father's right to impose
such treatment does not infringe upon the woman's fundamental
right to abortion, the natural father may even require medical treat-
ment prior to viability.
In determining the scope of the father's interest in potential
human life, the legal system must remain cognizant of the adver-
sarial relationship that forced medical treatment cases create be-
tween a mother and father. Although pregnant women rarely refuse
medical treatment that benefits the fetus, the mother's failure to act
may justify the biological father's intervention. Consequently, courts
should honor a father's request to require a mother to receive medi-
cal treatment necessary to sustain fetal life.
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